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From a Sociologya of Interest to a Sociology of Innovation: Transfer 
of French Technology to Brazil * 
INTRODUCTION 
Technical innovation can result from several 
processes, though most frequently it oc- 
curs in the context of transfer of technol- 
ogy. By studying the process of transfer 
over long-term, one can examine the con- 
ditions that are conducive or non-conducive 
to the process of innovation. 
It has always been considered that econ- 
omic factors determine the social and so- 
ciological aspects of transfer of technology. 
However, one can now see that the latter 
are being increasingly taken into account 
as much by the technology-offering coun- 
tries struggling for economic success in a 
highly competitive world market, as by 
those seeking technology. For, each coun- 
try, company, or social group within the 
company, is far more conscious about the 
development methods that they are yet to 
discover and they cannot restrict them- 
selves to a simple imitation or repetition, 
i.e. reducing everything to technique. They 
must take into account their own social 
contexts, so as to obtain the best produc- 
tivity/quality through the social form in 
which their actors are mobilised, who are, 
after all, not only technical and professional 
beings, but also social. 
The present article aims at studying the 
relation between the conditions which con- 
tribute to the process of transfer and bring 
the two companies together and the dy- 
namics of work collectives and the transfer 
agents. The latter are spurred by a ration- 
ality - that is not purely techno-economic, 
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otherwise, it wouíd have sufficed to study 
companies as units of action. It is basically 
also ethical, thus bringing into play such 
aspects as nationalism, development ideol- 
ogies, or even specific social group inter- 
ests. 
The hypothesis, therefore, is that the 
framework within which the transfers take 
place, and are concretised, never fully de- 
fines the modalities of cooperation or of 
conflict between the work collectives. The 
modalities of this cooperation, whether fi- 
nally elaborated or not, allow us to ob- 
serve the real capacities of technology-giv- 
ing company that have to be transferred 
(how to run equipment or a process under 
new conditions, or the receiving company’s 
readiness to learn), and the receiving par- 
ty’s capacity to make use of the foreign 
technical know-how which must be under- 
stood by them before being adopted. This 
“exchange” of knowledge is inevitable: it 
may not take place for reasons linked to 
the conditions of transfer; but it covers the 
modalities of the existing cooperation as al- 
so the possibilities for future collaboration. 
Thus, norms of cooperation are established 
between the work collectives which are in- 
ternal to themselves, and go beyond the 
issues that bring about this cooperation. 
Therefore, this context of cooperation must 
be given its due place, hitherto ignored, 
which it re-acquires in the process of 
transfer, so as to examine the extent to 
which it restructures the basic issues. It is 
thus necessary to cross from a sociology 
of interest, the most frequently used para- 
digm for transfer studies, to a sociology of 
innovation in the context of transfer. 
An analysis of the relations of coopera- 
tion over long-term is significant to the 
chronology of events that we have located 
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again in their context. Therefore, an at- 
tempt is being made to describe, for each 
of the cases studied here, the context of 
the country, of the companies, and their 
relations. Attempt is also being made to 
comprehend the reasons behind this coop- 
eration or non-cooperation at its different 
stages, from the conception of a product 
to its manufacturing, from the conception 
of a process to its realization. 
CQNTEXT 
THE CASE OF PUM (1) IN BRAZIL 
PUM was founded in Brazil in 1954 by F 
Sider, the owner of the French CASP. It is 
a factory in the countryside in a small city 
(160 km from Sao Paulo) as in France. 
Right from the beginning, a paternalistic 
form of management is instituted (restaur- 
ant, sports, “celebration” of secular or 
family festivals in the factory) with the help 
of about one hundred skilled French work- 
ers. Several of them have actually settled 
in Brazil. Right from the start, parts of hy- 
droelectric turbines were manufactured-a 
product which concerns us for this case- 
study-some of them had already been 
sold a little before this installation. 
In 1968, CASP took over IBHY, the main 
designer and manufacturer of hydroelectric 
turbines in France. SVP, specialised medi- 
um-scale hydraulic Study Bureau , whose 
main share-holder was CASP, was also in 
the same company, and IBHY worked 
mainly with EDF (“Electricite de France”) 
This is taken as the starting point since it 
corresponds to the launching of massive 
hydroelectric barrage programmes, under- 
taken by the military regime of Brazil. 
When the CASP was liquidated in 1985, 
IBHY entered the TOMALO group which 
manufactured gas turbines (under license 
from the General Electric, USA), and which 
had taken over the TARO (steam turbines) 
and ROGE (pumps) companies. This coin- 
cided with the end of the big barrages in 
Brazil on grounds that State was heavily in- 
debted, and which allowed PUM to plan 
again its productive activity easily. 
Today, TOMALO (70%, of which 
IBHY-19%) is the main shareholder of 
PUM: the other share-holder is MAN, a 
German maritine diesel motor manufacturer. 
For reasons given above (absence of state 
finance), this activity for quite some time 
now has been facing a severe recession in 
Brazil, 
Among the competitors of .PUM is a Ger- 
man multinational in which’ the majority 
capital is Brazilian, and a Brazilian company 
which works under foreign .or French li- 
censes (TOMALO for the thermal power 
stations). 
THE BRAZILIAN STATE AND TRANSFER 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
The role of the State as the arbiter of 
national interest outgrows in this case, 
since it is also a client; it plans the energy 
resources development, and pmcures and 
administers international loans. 
STATE AS A LEGISLATOR 
The legislation of the National Institute of 
Industrial Property (INPI) stipulates (article 
15) that a parent company cannot sell 
technology to a subsidiary. The objective is 
to stimulate ~e creation of joint ventures 
in which the Brazilian companies have ma- 
jority shares: in that case, the transfers of 
technology can be paid for. Obstacle to 
selling, among other factors (for instance, 
a majority share-holding foreign company 
can not obtain long-term finance from the 
National Investment Bank), can be such -a 
constraint that certain companies modify 
their capital in a way that they manage to 
hold majority shares in the country, while 
retaining, at the same time, their decision- 
making power in investment and technology 
matters. An extremely small amount of for- 
eign capital, supplemented by a tiny share 
earmarked for a chosen few, generally peo- 
ple of the same origins but Brazilian citim- 
ens, can be sufficient to have a majority, 
By prohibiting the parent company-subsi- 
diary sales, the law also prohibits all regis- 
tration with the INPI, which in turn, blocks 
all possibilities of seeking protection for the 
technology from this institution. This abs- 
ence of protection for technology does not 
appear to be a restricting factor for trans- 
fers, because the companies have to han- 
dle their mutual competition and, in that 
sense, are even condemned to progress: 
but at the same time, each of them has a 
tendency to close up, to withhold its sec- 
rets rather than eventually. sell them-even 
if, sooner or later, everyone know-s them 
through channels which lie beyond the na- 
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tional boundaries. It seems that the prac- 
tice of laying of engineers between com- 
peting companies is not delinked to this 
legislative measure. 
One can raise some vital questions: does 
this have a pernicious effect from the 
standpoint of dissemination, and innovation 
of technology, because the State is meant 
to encourage appropriation of technologies 
on its territory? Does it mean that by al- 
lowing technology sales between the parent 
company and the subsidiary, or by making 
it compulsory, the legislation will hasten 
tion? It does not,seem to be the case be- 
cause one can register with INPl in an 
opaque manner (black box), an opacity 
which lasts sufficiently long to avoid runn- 
ing into competitors. 
In fact, the law called “National Similar” 
prohibits import of all such technology 
which can be found in Brazil. Each demand 
for import is advertised, and any company 
claiming to have the capacity to supply the 
same product or process, can raise objec- 
tion to this demand. The multinational sub- 
sidiaries could be affected by this because 
their technology does not necessarily come 
from their parent companies. The deadline 
for the instruction files is sufficiently long, 
but the development of the national tech- 
nological network gets a fillip. 
Thus, the legislation makes the subsidia- 
ries confront the parent companies by re- 
ducing their capacity to take action (seek- 
ing finance) on the national territory. Even 
if the foreign companies, generally speak- 
ing, are well treated in Brazil (profits up to 
12% of capital can be repatriated annually), 
this factor can make the subsidiaries feel 
strangers in Brazil, and make them either 
withdraw before the parent company or 
work out strategies of changing their im- 
age. 
THE STATE AS A CLIENT 
The massive construction programme, in- 
augurated in the Kubitscheck period (1950- 
55), was given a new impetus. in the late 
60s with the building of some twenty big 
barrages, within a span of 15 years; these 
changed the energy map of the country. 
PUM can be seen on virtually all the sites, 
supplying turbines, valves, penstocks, con- 
trol motors, rolling bridges, and controlling 
I the progress of technological dissemina- 
dCH TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL 
systems. By virtue of its experience in the 
field, it led the consortium of companies 
working on a site four-times in the early 
80s. 
The negotiations between the Brazilian 
State and the French companies involve 
the French State which backs its own com- 
panies (as other countries do their own) by 
granting loans to the Brazilian Government. 
PUM jointly intervenes with IBHY which 
has the hydraulic technology for the big 
barrages, and even when PUM is the head 
of the consortia, IBHY stands by its side. 
The technology policy of the Brazilian State 
is thus defined by two contradictory needs: 
(i) IBHY transfers its technology to PUM, 
and (i¡) IBHY, in the last instance, controls 
the installations. The indirect pressure on 
the part of the State can manifest itself at 
the time of signing a contract, when, for 
instance, it demands that PUM install a hy- 
draulic laboratory in Brazil. 
One can thus observe that a Client-State 
applies the criteria of a Legislator-State. 
However, it may be stated at the outset 
that its interventions are not too frequent, 
and take place over 10 years after the 
execution of successive contracts. The 
PUM-IBHY relations are thus located in this 
context. In what follows, tracing the history 
of collaboration between these two com- 
panies in the institutional context of IBHY 
in France (which has undergone some 
changes), the evolution of cooperation bet- 
ween PUM and IBHY, in each sector, from 
manufacuring to conception is described 
here. 
PUM/IBHY AND PUWI/SVP: TWO FORMS 
OF TECHNQLQGICAL COOPERATION 
PUM/IBHK “PUM IS THE CREATION OF 
A MANUFACTURER (SIMR) AND HAS 
REMAINED AS SUCH”. 
The meaning of this common expression 
depends on who utters it. For the Brazilian 
engineers who accept PUM’s manufacturing 
qualities regardless of their criticism that 
no transfer of technology was made in the 
field of hydraulic designing, it means that 
PUM did not know how to go beyond its 
task and demand IBHY to transfer its 
know-how in this domain. For the French 
engineers, those of CASP, it means that 
they have done their part of the job of 
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transfer, and that IBHY, on its part, did not 
want to do it. For the French engineers, 
those of IBHY, it means that the PUM 
never had the capacity, nor did it ever 
want to possess the financial and human 
resources needed to accomplish this task. 
Each group, which analyses transfer from 
its own standpoint, gives its own version 
of truth. In each case, there is a company, 
or professional patriotism which finds its 
own quallity of. work implicated in the 
question of transfer of technology, regard- 
less of the fact that their strategies might 
have been different. The current relevance 
or the seriousness of this issue is shown 
by the fact that the hydraulic laboratory in 
question was never set up, even though its 
lay-out has been exhibited in one the 
rooms of the Study Bureau, and that ev- 
eryone has wondered who, or what, went 
wrong in the decision-making process. 
While all this has been going on, a Brazil- 
ian competitor has begun setting up his la- 
boratory. In PUM, as also in IBHY, a ques- 
tion hangs in the air: did we make the 
best choice for future planning? 
This question, raised here contextually, 
underpins systematically the relations be- 
tween the different collectives involved in 
the act of cooperation-not in terms of the 
choice of each strategy which might be 
decisive for a collective endeavour but as 
a need, for each of the groups involved, to 
find a professional morality that could 
guide their work relations and communic- 
ations. The contracts are essentially tech- 
no-economic, and can not forsee every- 
thing: one can observe the extent to which 
the relationship between a parent company 
and its subsidiary in Brazil depend on infor- 
mal factors. Therefore, one must proceed 
bearing in mind that technical development 
and technology transfer are never autono- 
mous, but always the product of a social 
relationship. 
PUMBVP 
The case of applied hydraulics is different 
from that of the turbines. The manufacture 
of valves, locks, pumps, carries less tech- 
nical and economic weight than the tur- 
bines, but the problem does not lie at this 
level. The applied hydraulics is controlled 
by SVP which is in the same group as 
IBHY since 1968. Unlike IBHY, SVP designs 
but does not manufacture, or manufactures 
little. One could thus imagine that the con- 
trol of design for such companies is a 
more crucial issue. But one finds that it is 
the opposite phenomenon that reveals it- 
self: over roughly 12 years, SVP trans- 
ferred all its design technology to PUM. 
The latter even manifested a real desire to 
acquire it. SVP could even have refused 
this process, especially when exchange, 
outside specific contracts, largely takes 
place along informal lines-against a tech- 
nology that BVS gives, slowly but without 
hesitation, depending on the PUM Study 
Bureau Chief’s visits to France, only pro- 
mises of information (fulfilled later) on the 
new markets in Latin America. 
What really marks this process is the 
SVP culture. For the Study Bureau engi- 
neers, who comprise majority of the com- 
pany’s personnel, the constitution of an 
equal network is in the short term a more 
useful investment from the professional 
standpoint than retaining know-how from 
the economic standpoint. Amongst the ben- 
efits, there is the professional interest of a 
future collaboration. This pertains to all the 
cases of maintenance of the installations. If 
SVP has to travel (and it is certainly not 
for trivialities) one cannot ignore the exper- 
ience gained from the functioning of install- 
ations spread all over the world. An intel- 
lectual stimulation, lies within this process 
to accept the challenge that the collective 
will be capable of innovating in future, and 
that it is part of the job. 
This differentiates the SVP culture from 
that of IBHY. The latter, even though it op- 
erates globally as much as the SVP, is 
above all the approved supplier of EDF 
which provides it with a captive market, by 
virtue of being the main designer-manufac- 
turer of the French hydroelectric equip- 
ment. Its collaborations with the foreign 
countries are underlined by this practice: 
on the one hand, the routine of a quasi- 
monopoly supplier, linked to Brazil by the 
fact that it is France which, in many 
cases, provides loans to the Brazilian 
State; and on the other, an association be- 
tween designing and manufacturing which 
is at the root of an attitude. that manufac- 
turing, less prize-worthy, can be delegated, 
but not designing. 
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MODALITIES OF PUM/IBHY COOPERA- vel of rejects) of the workship. After a 
TlON training stint at a soldering equipment firm 
(Lincoln) in the US, the Brazilian Engineer 
innovation in each sector of production by started a programme of “socialisation of 
analysing the results of cooperation be- technical culture” which aimed at establish- 
tween work collectives is examined below. ing communication between th? solderers, 
and between the solderers and the coppers- 
METAMORPHOSIS IN TEACHER-TAUGHT miths-all done with the perspective’ of  re- 
RELATION (A FRENCH ENGINEER) ducing the levels of rejects. The individual 
traits of each of them were thus expected 
the soldering sector is very satisfactory. to surface, and only those would be re- 
“The pupil has overtaken the teacher”, tained which were compatible with the ob- 
some say, while referring to their case. At jectives of quality and efficiency. The usual 
the beginning, the “quality-oriented” mind conflicts between the solderers and the 
of SIDER concretised itself through the coppersmiths would thus be considerably 
CASP personnel, placing themselves at the reduced, and some spare-parts (grooves, 
helm of affairs of PUM, and by regularly the main part of the generator), hitherto 
sending French engineers and technicians not manufactured by PUM, would now be 
to take charge of the soldering section. In 
1979, this COtlCern to improve the quality This question of productivity arose at a 
led to the Setting Up Of a soldering labora- very specific moment-at the end of the 
tory, meant to experiment with new pro- big barrages period-and remained until 
CeSSeS worked Out in France or elsewhere PUM, by virtue of its export credits, had 
in the world, and to adapt them to lhe dif- either a captive or a low-competition mar- 
ferent types of Brazilian steel which are ket. Subsequently, it had to switch to other 
not the exact equivalents of those in areas of tougher competition, emgm manu- 
France. Right from this period onwards, facturing and maintenance of different 
PUM was kept constantly to date in types of industrial equipment, particularly 
this sector- For four to five years, the for the steel and petrochemical industry. 
heads Of the section were One comes across this question later also. 
French, then a Portuguese engineer, and fl- It suffices to remark that, in the search for 
nally a Brazilian engineer since mid-87. productivity, PUM used an autonomy 
Moreover, the Various inStitUtiOna1 changes it already had, though it had not yet felt 
in PuM mentioned above did not affect the the necessity to draw on it. This experi- 
process of transfer, perhaps because Of ence will later prove to be exemplary, be- 
the existence Of a public StrUCUre Of train- cause the Brazilian engineer in-charge of 
ing in France-the Institute Of Soldering- soldering would be aBached to the Meth- 
where the French engineers and then the ods Department of work, jointly with 
Brazilians undergo training courses. But be- others, on the processes of rationalisation. 
hind this success was CASP’s concern for 
DEMAND-SUPPLY DETERMINANT OF 
quality and its own reputation, relayed by 
LEARNING (A BRAZILIAN ENGINEER) 
IBHY, worldover. 
As regards the question of the sluggish- 
ness of transfer of technology, it can be There is an unanimous opinion in another 
seen that soldering technology is a crucial sense in the field of mechanisation on the 
point for hydroelectric power stations, all other hand. If today, PUM has genuine 
faults leading to the stoppage of a turbine skills in mechanisation, there is no produc- 
and long and expensive repairs. tive appropriation of the processes. The 
Nonetheless, a little after the soldering reason, mentioned earlier, lies undoubtedly 
section was taken over by a Brazilian engi- in their lack of interest in productivity, 
neer, the conception of work changed. It which must be supplemented with the low 
seemed that the work culture which char- cost of manpower. However, the Brazilian 
acterized the solderers and the coopers- competitors are at the same level, and 
miths individually, was insufficient to re- PUM does not have a comparative advan- 
solve the problems of productivity (high le- tage on this score. It is then the lack of 
The process of transfer and technological 
Both from the PUM and the IBHY side, 
done. 
I 
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competition in the market that explains the 
lack of interest in productivity. 
Mechanisation is also a different job: it is 
more about reducing and shaping matter 
than creating it. It is an auxiliary activity in 
the CASP tradition, less respected than a 
solderer’s or a coppersmith’s work. More- 
over, given the lower level of Brazilian 
equipment as compared with the French, 
the practice was to send such engineers 
to take charge of the ”Methods and Pro- 
cesses” section who were more mature, 
and experienced, thus capable of finding 
solutions to the situations fraught with in- 
certitudes more than is the case in France. 
The young, less experienced engineers, 
who, on the other hand, might have had a 
more modern vision of mechanisation were 
not sent. Lastly, the ,development of the di- 
gital control in the 70s coincided with the 
drop in CASP‘s activities, and whilst IBHY 
was successfully negotiating this turn for it- 
self, it did not in the beginning want its 
subsidiaries to have the same know-how. 
PUM, from its own standpoint, had noticed 
its inadequacies in 1982, the final year of 
the signing of the last two big barrage 
contracts and had demanded from then 
onwards a larger aid and “new” engineers 
in this field. This demand was fulfilled only 
three years later, and the time required for 
changing habits and work methods implied 
that it is only now that the computerization 
of the range of machining tools, or even a 
systematic classification of the processes 
and methods used, is taking place. PUM 
now recruits Brazilian engineers, entrusted 
specially with the task of modernising the 
company in this field. 
With this general framework, one can un- 
derstand why both sides did not show con- 
cern for a more rapid modernization. Fore- 
casts and planning are done on a short 
term-basis rather than on medium- or long- 
term. However, the demand made by the 
technology-received side triggers off a dy- 
namic between the giving and the receiving 
party that can be illustrated ’ by the follow- 
ing instances. 
Product technology is always spelt out 
with detailed specifications in formal con- 
tracts, whereas the process teçhnology is 
more informal. This can be interpreted in 
two ways-either as confidence shown by 
the parent company towards its subsidiary, 
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or as fear on the part of the former to 
give excessive autonomy to the latter 
which could eventually become a competi- 
tor. Matters are both simple and complicat- 
ed. They can be summarised thus: the 
technology-giver gives what he can give, 
and that the receiver is capable of dem- 
anding; the receiver accepts what he can 
accept, and that the giver can give. This 
interpretation is valid for the details or the 
examples taken in the general context 
where two work collectives are involved in 
an act of cooperation. It indicates that a 
certain quality of relationship can exist in 
the cooperation between two work collec- 
tives which, in an exemplary case, meets 
the needs of the collaborating parties, and 
shows the method to be used for improv- 
ing this cooperation. 
When a mechanisation process is being 
installed on the three axes of the main 
vanes of a turbine, the parent company 
sends an engineer who comes with a pro- 
gramme on a perforated strip. Mis work is 
only to install the programme. The Meth- 
ods engineer of PUM refuses to use a pro- 
gramme because ‘he knows nothing about 
its conception. When the first engineer 
does not want to, or cannot, give the re- 
quired explanations, PUM demands that a 
second engineer be sent to modify, if need 
be, the programme, so as to suit its future 
needs. This event is seen as a positive 
step from both sides as a mark of a cer- 
tain code of work morality. But even in this 
case, the condition still was that the re- 
ceiver could demand and the giver, give. 
A similar problem crops up in the con- 
text of internal relations between sections 
of the technology-receiving company. This 
problem is, often, related to the type of di- 
vision of work which defines the parent 
company/subsidiary relations. It is at times 
difficult for the “Methods and Processes” 
division in Brazil to work out a work pro- 
gramme which can reconcile the technical 
and productivity requirements of the pro- 
ject. Therefore, the task falls on the Ma- 
nager of this Division to work his way up- 
wards, a procedure which is not necessari- 
ly frequent in a compnay, even less when 
the licensing company and the manufactur- 
er are two different companies. Generally 
speaking, the “hierarchical culture” is an 
impediment to technological innovation and 
I 
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its dissemination, whether it be inside the 
company or between two companies. Ac- 
cording to the French engineers in Brazil, it 
is more well-entrenched in Brazil than in 
France, although one must not lose sight 
of the fact that the intensity of informal 
personal relations can often dilute the for- 
malism of hierarchical relations. This arises 
from a similar process as mentioned 
above-if one dares not demand what one 
must, (in this case, explanations about up- 
stream matters, from mechanisation to 
methods, from methods to bureau study), 
one can not have them. 
Last example on the subject of productiv- 
ity can be thus seen: There exists in PUM, 
or until very recently existed a secret prac- 
tice of cost prices-of products, of hourly 
cost of machines, of wages. This practice 
is differently interpreted: viz. apprehension 
that the competitors might find out the 
cost price and work out more competitive 
prices, fear that the‘ workers might use 
their knowledge of the hourly cost of ma- 
chines as an argument to seek wage-hikes, 
a concern of quality replacing productivity. 
Whatever be the interpretation, one thing is 
certain: there is neither integration nor in- 
teraction between the manufacturing, the 
methods and the finance divisions. Thus, 
even if there is some steering mechanism, 
in the top hierarchy, right at the beginning, 
he gets rid of all culture of technological 
appropriation inside the receiving company, 
given that the term “technological” is used 
in its widest sense-as a technology of 
product, process and management. Good 
informal relations between human beings 
cannot suffice to create this kind of inte- 
gration. 
RESEARCH-DEVEL~PBnEMT-+HE LOGIC 
OF “HEAD” AND “GUTS” 
Mechanical design depends on the hy- 
draulic design which gives form to the tur- 
bines. This form is defined by a set of in- 
terdependent points which, before bearing 
any pressure, must have some resistance. 
The basic studies are carried out in 
France, and the detailed ones in Brazil. 
The basic studies cover matters related to 
the dimension and the designs as also the 
technical specification which depend, on 
the one hand, on the availability of raw 
materials and, on the other hand, on 
manufacturing constraints. The detailed 
studies further specify the basic studies, 
adapt them in light of the supply and 
manufacturing constraints at the place of 
manufacture (a slightly pejorative term 
“tropicalisation” is often used), rework the 
unified design and carry out the necessary 
adaptations. 
In the opinion of some French engineers 
of the Studies Bureau who worked in Brazil 
before returning to France, the detailed 
study has to be done on the basis of the 
same principles as those which under- 
pinned the basic study. The detailed study 
must logically and naturally lead back to 
the basic study-one only needs to have 
more powerful means of computation. Ac- 
cording to the others, Brazil does not lack 
any theoretical knowledge, but She is weak 
in technological knowledge. 
It appears that PUM has been preparing 
a detailed study for the last ten years; it is 
largely based on the supply and manufac- 
turing, thus tebhnological conditions. The 
Brazilian State demanded in 1973-74 that 
the detailed study be performed in Brazil. 
This demand was partly fulfilled, since the 
final verifications of all that were put to- 
gether by PUM were supervised by IBHY. 
It is difficult to say whether this was due 
to an “informal” demand of the State 
which is also a client, or IBHY did not 
want to take any risk. For the first time in 
1990, fpllowing a private order, IBHY no 
longer supervised PUM’s detailed study. 
Besides, PUM’s official programme proc- 
laims that the engineering expertise re- 
quired for detailed studies will be finally ac- 
quired by 1991, when the Study Bureau will 
take over the basic studies. 
The Brazilian engineers are convinced 
that the detailed studies are no longer a 
mystery for them, and that they will be 
able to develop the basic studies. At the 
moment, a French engineer heads the 
Study Bureau (Turbines). The question of 
acquiring technology, however, does not 
give rise to any serious debate. Every 
thing takes place as though PUM had al- 
ready acquired technology, even if the 
heads of the Study Bureau are success- 
ively French. On the other hand, the deb- 
ate on the transfer of a hydraulic laborato- 
ry to PUM is far from over. If that had 
been done, it is obvious that the mechani- 
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cal basic studies 
out in Brazil. 
would have been carried 
The discussions on installing a hydraulic 
laboratory have taken place since 1974-75. 
Towards the end of the 70s, CASP pro- 
mised, or suggested, to instal it. Its con- 
struction was finally programmed when a 
contract was signed in 1980; its cost was 
10% of the contract. Ten years later, no 
one really remembers the correct figure, 
but every one feels that it was zero or 
much less than 10% (as though its cost 
had been overvalued) as though every one, 
Brazilian or French, was regretting the 
lapse. 
For IBHY, it was almost impossible to 
withstand the pressures of the Brazilian 
State, given the number and size of con- 
tracts that it had obtained over the last ten 
years. At the same time, in none of the 
eleven countries where it has set up subsi- 
diaries or joint ventures, some of whom 
are extremely reputed for their technical 
skills (Canada) or technological nationalism 
(India), it has set up a hydraulic laboratory. 
For the company, this is a matter of de- 
fending the very core of its profession, 
which is the root of its respectability and 
pride, as also the secret of its innovative 
skills. At the same time, the argument that 
installing a laboratory abroad is non-profit- 
able, is not wrong: for similar reasons, Ca- 
nada retreated before such an investment; 
IBHY has designed 2665 turbomachines 
(since the 30s) and installed them in 58 
countries, and all from one single laborato- 
ry. 
However, the laboratory was not set up, 
as was the case with some other things in 
the contract, because the Brazilian govern- 
ment did not pay. This official reason can 
not be refuted. It must, however, be noted 
that each one blames the other for not 
having helped in its creation. This issue 
has really acquired relevance today; now 
that a Brazilian competitor is constructing a 
laboratory, it is “strategic mistake”, say 
many Brazilian engineers, some of whom 
have been approached by this competitor. 
The fact that the latter is more an electri- 
cal, than a hydraulic engineer has some, 
predict his failure; but the process, how- 
ever, is on, and the Brazilian and the 
South American market is still full of pot- 
entialities,’ even if there are problems in 
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the short-run. Lastly, the Brazilian govern- 
ment has all the legal means (National Si- 
milar Law) to assist a domestic company 
compete with a multinational. 
This was,. however, not the first experi- 
ence for IBHY and PUM in this field. For, 
a few years ago, the same competitor had 
attempted to bring together the different 
parties (based in Brazil, domestic or 
others) on the sites of the big barrages in- 
itiated with the assistance of the state 
“techno-structure” and had failed, and end- 
ed up in the creation of a foundation, fin- 
anced by the same parties, and affiliated 
to the University of Sao Paulo. Controlled 
by ’the latter, and the product of a failure, 
this foundation exists in a state of fair in- 
ertia. PUM tried to go beyond this experi- 
ence in 1987 by creating a laboratory in 
conjunction with the University of Minas 
Geraes to design small turbines. Another 
compensation was the installation of a de- 
partment of regulation at PUM, until now 
under the control of IBHY. These compens- 
ations, which resulted from the absence of 
a programme of technology transfer, de- 
spite the termination of the big barrages 
construction programme and the existing 
recession, etc., have not managed to re- 
move the bitter taste present among all 
the actors at present in Brazil. A techno- 
logical adventure was at one’s arms length, 
and everyone was ready to be involved in 
it. This also made them remain leaders in 
Latin America in this field. This episode 
demonstrates both the power of the dy- 
namic of cooperation, strongly supported 
by the Brazilian government, and its power- 
lessness in the face of questions of strate- 
gy. The French side presents it as a con- 
tradiction between two forms of logic-that 
of the “head” and that of the “guts”, but 
viewed from the Brazilian side, this could 
be inversed to assert that the ”head” was 
Brazilian and the “guts” French. What 
would have happened to it if the Brazilian 
government had paid? 
ROLE OF INTERNAL COMPETITION 
By regulation is meant the system of 
maintenance and control of a power sta- 
tion-maintenance of the oil station, func- 
tional engineering (control of starting and 
stopping sequence, monitoring of water 
flow, of the cycle, of power), and the elec- 
tronic regulation of the assembly. Despite a 
long-standing grievance against the French, 
a Brazilian engineer was sent to France in 
1987-rather too late, from a technical 
standpoint-with the mission of setting up 
a regulation service on his return. Barely 
had he got back then he found another 
competitor who was busy working on a si- 
milar project. A second engineer was sent 
for a shorter duration, and with the more 
limited objective of learning to run the af- 
ter-sales service and of manufacturing 
some elements of the mechanical part. Fi- 
nally, a French engineer arrived in 1990 to 
locally put together all elements needed for 
the running of a regulason system-looking 
for materials, manufacturers, and for sett- 
ing up the assembly. It seems to have 
been a serious decision since before leav- 
ing France, this engineer, who had already 
worked in the regulation department of 
quality control, was trained in all services 
of the department. This decision appears 
to have been taken so as to make up for 
the lost ground vis-a-vis a competitor who 
had started off earlier. Again, this decision 
was presented as indispensable, given the 
high import duties on electronic and com- 
puter equipment, but these duties have ex- 
isted since long, and these were not the 
determining element in making this choice. 
This example clearly shows that the pro- 
cess of technology transfer depends largely 
on the existing level of competition in the re- 
ceiver-country; it also indicates that the com- 
panies have some difficulty in holding back 
their technical know-how in a context of stiff 
competition, and when the collective or indi- 
vidual competence of the others are unknown 
or uncertain. Hence, the tendency of each 
company to close up, and fall back partieular- 
ly on its national companies in the case of a 
multinational. It is in this sense that the pres- 
ence of French heads of service in many sec- 
tors of the company must be understood; it 
does not imply that technology was not trans- 
ferred to the local engineers, but that great 
importance is attached to how information is 
controlled and divulged. 
Perhaps too much must not be made of this 
phenomenon of “brain drain” between the na- 
tional competitors, in the sense that within 
the social group of engineers and, more gen- 
erally, in the industrial circles, there exists a 
particular culture called “immediatism”. None 
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is quite sour of its origins, and it seems to 
have developed with the industry. Basically, 
from an individual’s standpoint, it implies the 
readiness to seize-if need be, by “bluffing” 
whatever opportunity or immediate gain that 
comes his way regardless of the long-term 
benefits. 
Be that as it may, what is certain is that at 
the base of it lies the management and hu- 
man resources policy of the company, which 
leads us to study a new aspect of the prob- 
lem of transfer of technology. The term “ma- 
nagement”, in this case, refers to two is- 
sues-first, the division of work between the 
parent company and the subsidiaries, and 
their respective integlcation into a system of 
work and representations acceptable to all; 
and secondly, the organizational and manage- 
ment system of the subsidiary and its evalua- 
tion of its own competence to modify, and 
thus innovate, through its relation with the 
parent company-the latter is always consid- 
ered to be “more advanced”, and in a position 
to indicate the general rules for the healthy 
functioning of the organizations. 
PARENT COMPANY, SUBSIDIARY AND 
MANAGEMENT: A LARGER CONSENSUS 
ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE? 
The creation in 1988 of the “IBHY Network” 
answered a dual necessity : first, of maintain- 
ing regular, formal, almost solemn information 
and exchange relations at the highest level 
(with the four directors of the twelve industrial 
units in the world), so that each can find his 
progress reflected in the development of the 
entire company; secondly, of setting up an in- 
tegrated system of R&D, in which each coun- 
try will have its share (complementary to that 
of the others) in a coherent international sys- 
tem. 
The network met for the first time in 1989, 
and it will be premature to speak of its work 
perspectives. Its first findings may be quite 
unpredictable, as they arise out of a new con- 
text. However, if the strategy of the Centre, 
which until now was the only one taking deci- 
sions on “private” negotiations with each of 
the subsidiaries, favours greater integration or 
collective decision-making, one can expect 
that each of the local-national cultures will be 
modified by it. 
It is expect9d that the international produc- 
tion division will be better organized, integrat- 
ed, and that ,each subsidiary will be a little 
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less dependent on the local-national market. 
But for this, it must at first give proof of its 
competitiveness within the group, and then, if 
need be, align ¡tielf along the strategic choice 
proposed to the Centre. Even if it is left to the 
subsidiaries to decide on their means (manu- 
facturing processes and style of manage- 
ment), the idea of a greater mobility of engi- 
neers between the subsidiaries (only the Cen- 
tre engineers, or all of them?) augers a grea- 
ter uniformity of management. 
In the field of R&D, it seems that there will 
be minor modifications. As opposed to dec- 
entralisation, the tendency is to concentrate 
R&D in the central cities, if required in the 
form of partial cooperations between multina- 
tionals. This will leave behind only a few 
traces for specific projects, and that too of 
little importance. 
Given several factors like the gap that can 
always exist between thoughts and reality, 
the incertitude of the final outcome of pro- 
jects even though they might have risen out 
of identical strategies and the newness of 
projects, it is not easy to give an answer to 
the question : can the ongoing integration 
strategy forge a group consensus on an inter- 
national scale? Is it, on the other hand, likely 
to instigate the process of getting rebuffs 
from the Statebacked national industrial cul- 
tures whose concern is to indigenise knowl- 
edge and technology, and not just its applic- 
ations and organizational models? 
THE SUBSIDIARY: AN ORIGINAL OR 
STANDARD MANAGEMENT? 
The question of management came up re- 
cently, several years after the crisis of the 
“big barrages” production model. This delay 
can be explained by the fact that the com- 
pany had to look for new areas of production 
and could not think of reorganising itself with- 
out knowing what it was going to produce. 
While analysing the manufacturing sector, it 
was observed that an organizational culture 
gradually superimposed itself on a job-orient- 
ed culture. The variety of new forms of pro- 
duction that came into being, added to a dras- 
tic reduction in personnel (3200 employees in 
1982 and 950 in 1990) led logically to a de- 
mand for transferring parent company’s orga- 
nizational technology to the subsidiary. 
This demand came rather belatedly only af- 
ter several visits by French production ex- 
perts, and when many Brazilian engineers, 
who had collectively started modifying the 
work system in their sector, had been pro- 
moted. But this was still not enough. A more 
systematic reorganization was needed. This 
was done-and the timing is not unimportant- 
a little after the last great wave of retrench- 
ments in April 1989. It was at this time that a 
French organization consultant, who was sug- 
gested and indicated by the parent company 
following a demand from PUM, was called in. 
The consultant conducted an “audit” with 
the help of a group of five Brazilian engineers, 
each of whom was in-charge of a field, 
though not its experts. Given the objective, 
the group was set (“to obtain an international- 
level productivity”) on the basis of a wage/ 
turn-over ratio. Their conclusions seem to be 
almost the same as those in the West-merg- 
ing of the work methods, using computeriza- 
tion to reduce the weight of bureaucracy, de- 
finition and programming of medium-term tar- 
gets, succinct analysis of work, reduction in 
the levels of hierarchy, elaboration of a com- 
pany’s project. Visits to the TOMALO group 
companies became a regular feature for the 
Brazilian head of the group. A real exchange 
took place between the latter and the Adviso- 
ry Board which, being above the company’s 
hierarchical structures, slowly perfected the 
propositions and introduced the changes. A 
reflection of the new times-the Director (In- 
dustry), in-charge of these radical changes is, 
for the first time since 1954, a Brazilian (Janu- 
ary 1990): besides; this is the first time that 
an administrator, instead of an engineer, has 
been asked to take over this charge. His aim 
is to “make the company walk on its own 
legs, and advance, without losing its balance, 
on all fronts”. 
This significant change of perspectives 
goes hand in hand with the creation of three 
posts of “Project Managers” who, after the 
signing of the contract with the client, are as- 
signed the task of supervising the manufac- 
ture of a product in the factory, of ensuring 
the company-supplier coordination, of having 
a product delivered in required time and to 
look after the after-sales service until the peri- 
od of guarantee is over. This is an attempt 
towards “just in time” production in small 
batches, something which would have been 
impossible without prior rationalization of the 
work process. 
Finally, Brazilian engineers will no longer be 
recruited, as was the case until now, from the 
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regional colleges, known to be average. Since 
they can not guarantee a relative stability in 
supplying such skilled manpower, the recruit- 
ment will now be done from the distinguished 
colleges of Rio and Sao Paulo. There will be 
systematic training programmes at the time of 
joining the company: vivid perspectives of 
career will be offered; and in order to combat 
the problem of engineers fleeing at the end of 
training programmes, more than the required 
number of engineers will be recruited. These 
changes, added to the new salary structure 
for the engineers (implemented in 1988) per- 
mitting the Study Bureau engineers to have 
the same salary as those in the production 
section, will help to settle down this section 
of the personnel. This will also help resolve 
the problem of capacity of technological ap- 
propriation, which was the pretext on which 
IBHY justified its hesitations in matters of 
technology transfer. 
In the last instance, NEM, the German 
share-holder, will be contacted again, particu- 
larly for the machining section for which it has 
an uncontested reputation. 
These measures, largely inspired by the or- 
ganizational and management techniques that 
have been successful in the West, do not im- 
ply an excessive dependence of the subsidi- 
ary on the parent company. In fact, a greater 
autonomy seems to result from it; it remains 
to be seen though, how this autonomy can 
function within the framework of the new 
strategies put into operation by the parent 
company? 
PROFESSIONAL ETHIC AND PRODUCTIVE 
ETHIC 
This evolution of relations between the par- 
ent company and its subsidiary could be sum- 
marised thus: at the beginning, an agreement 
is signed in which the parent company’s posi- 
tion is all-powerful and its strategy, the deter- 
mining factor (quality of production). Follow- 
ing that, the subsidiary makes a demand for 
transfer, and the parent company answers it 
in terms of its capacities and strategy. 
The subsidiary does not live in splendid iso- 
lation and its surroundings (Government, 
competition) affect jts behaviour. However, 
the surroundings do not directly affect the 
company as they would as a whole; it medi- 
ates through certain social groups that are 
present within it. The latter themselves find a 
mediation in the cooperation collectives which 
have come to exist between the parent com- 
pany and the subsidiary. This dynamic can 
lead to influencing the subsidiary company’s 
decisions on the new agreements between 
the parent company and itself; it can also be 
blocked at this level. But it does not stop from 
existing, as it renews itself constantly, and 
strives for better and more balanced relations 
between the two partners. This dynamic is 
understood by the parent-company which at- 
tempts, by addressing itself to this profes- 
sional ethic, to orient it towards a productive 
ethic, while bearing in mind the changes in its 
own strategy which link the need to pay more 
attentiQn to the local partners’ autonomy and 
a more intense division of work. 
SUMMARY 
This paper studies long-term transfer of 
technology between the parent company, 
namely French and its subsidiary in Brazil. 
Highlighting the conditions of transfer as stip- 
ulated by the Brazilian legislation, and the role 
of the State as a client of the subsidiary com- 
pany, it analyses the various activities of the 
technology-receiving company (production, 
R&D, and management). It also examines the 
results of the cooperation between the two 
parties, and seeks to point to the reasons for 
their success or failure. The work culture of 
the two companies, the technological policies 
of the parent-company and the technology-re- 
ceiving State, and the competition in the latter 
are the various factors that help us to com- 
prehend the reasons behind success or fai- 
lure. These factors, however, express them- 
selves through the act of cooperation be- 
tween the work collectives of the technology 
giving/receiving countries. During the course 
of development cooperation, a professional 
ethic is born, itself the spirit behind transfer 
and innovation. One can thus sociologically 
analyse the new strategies of integrating the 
multinationals which use this ethic to direct it 
towards a productive ethic, wherein the in- 
digenous partners enjoy greater autonomy, 
and with an intense division of work. The hy- 
pothesis can thus be advanced that the dy- 
namic of the cooperation collectives will conti- 
nue to be based on a renewed professional 
ethic. 
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regional colleges, known to be average. Since 
they can not guarantee a relative stability in 
supplying such skilled manpower, the recruit- 
ment will now be done from the distinguished 
colleges of Rio and Sao Paulo. There will be 
systematic training programmes at the time of 
joining the company; vivid perspectives of 
career will be offered: and in order to combat 
the problem of engineers fleeing at the end of 
training programmes, more than the required 
number of engineers will be recruited. These 
changes, added to the new salary structure 
for the engineers (implemented in 1988) per- 
mitting the Study Bureau engineers to have 
the same salary as those in the production 
section, will help to settle down this section 
of the personnel. This will also help resolve 
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ent company and its subsidiary could be sum- 
marised thus: at the beginning, an agreement 
is signed in which the parent company’s posi- 
tion is all-powerful and its strategy, the deter- 
mining factor (quality of production). Follow- 
ing that, the subsidiary makes a demand for 
transfer, and the parent company answers it 
in terms of its capacities and strategy. 
The subsidiary does not live in splendid iso- 
lation and its surroundings (Government, 
competition) affect its behaviour. However, 
the surroundings do not directly affect the 
company as they would as a whole; it medi- 
ates through certain social groups that are 
present within it. The latter themselves find a 
mediation in the cooperation collectives which 
have come to exist between the parent com- 
pany and the subsidiary. This dynamic can 
lead to influencing the subsidiary company’s 
decisions on the new agreements between 
the parent company and itself; it cag also be 
blocked at this level. But it does not stop from 
existing, as it renews itself constantly, and 
strives for better and more balanced relations 
between the two partners. This dynamic is 
understood by the parent-company which at- 
tempts, by addressing itself to this profes- 
sional ethic, to orient it towards a productive 
ethic, while bearing in mind the changes in its 
own strategy which link the need to pay more 
attention to the local partners’ autonomy and 
a more intense division of work. 
SUMMARY 
This paper studies long-term transfer of 
technology between the parent company, 
namely French and its subsidiary in Brazil. 
Highlighting the conditions of transfer as stip- 
ulated by the Brazilian legislation, and the role 
of the State as a client of the subsidiary com- 
pany, it analyses the various activities of the 
technology-receiving company (production, 
R&D, and management). It also examines the 
results of the cooperation between the two 
parties, and seeks to point to the reasons for 
their success or failure. The work culture of 
the two companies, the technological policies 
of the parent-company and the technology-re- 
ceiving State, and the competition in the latter 
are the various factors that help us to com- 
prehend the reasons behind success or fai- 
lure. These factors, however, express them- 
selves through the act of cooperation be- 
tween the work collectives of the technology 
giving/receiving countries. During the course 
of development cooperation, a professional 
ethic is born, itself the spirit behind transfer 
and innovation. One can thus sociologically 
analyse the new strategies of integrating the 
multinationals which use this ethic to direct it 
towards a productive ethic, wherein the in- 
digenous partners enjoy greater autonovy, 
and with an intense division of work. The hy- 
pothesis can thus be advanced that the dy- 
namic of the cooperation collectives will conti- 
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